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Review Essay: Utopianism,
Epistemology, and Feminist Theory
Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law. By
Drucilla Cornell. New York: Routledge, 1991. Pp. ix, 239.
Susan H. Williamst
How can we describe the suffering of women, as well as women's strengths
and triumphs, without essentializing "Woman"? How can we build a movement
around the commonalities of women without ignoring the diversity of women?
In her recent book, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism,
Deconstruction, and the Law, Drucilla Cornell presents a way out of this
dilemma facing current feminist theory. The escape route is through
deconstruction and a particular type of feminine writing that constantly
challenges and transforms the meaning of sexual difference. "If there is a
central tenet in this book, it is that the condition in which the suffering of all
women can be 'seen' and 'heard,' in all of our difference, is that in which the
tyranny of established reality is disrupted and the possibility of further feminine
resistance and the writing of a different version of the story of sexual
difference is continually affirmed."'
Cornell begins by criticizing the work of Robin West and Catharine
MacKinnon, describing them both as essentialists and explaining why their
very different approaches fail to meet the ethical needs of feminism. She uses
their failures as guideposts to mark the cliff-edge of essentialism and then she
carefully traces a path that can avoid this precipice. She insists that we must
affirm the feminine (rather than repudiate it, like MacKinnon), but the
affirmation must be metaphoric (unlike West's) to avoid reinstating rigid
gender identities. The book is devoted to explaining how such an affirmation
of the feminine is possible and what it would mean.
Beyond Accommodation is an ambitious and impressive book. Cornell has
identified a very important problem in feminist theory and has offered a subtle,
detailed, and persuasive part of the solution. The book is required reading for
anyone concerned about issues of essentialism and epistemology in feminist
theory. Cornell's writing style is a little dense and difficult, but the insights
she offers make it worthwhile reading. Her mastery of the literature on
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deconstruction and French feminism is obvious, and she conveys its meaning
in prose that is generally far more comprehensible than the original texts.
This review will first sketch the major arguments made in Beyond
Accommodation and then offer some responses and suggestions. My primary
concern centers around Cornell's treatment of West and MacKinnon and how
it is tied to some of the remaining ambiguities in her own work. I believe that
Cornell's commitment to a difficult and not fully explicated conception of
creative utopianism leads her to underestimate the ultimate utility of West's
and MacKinnon's approaches. Cornell has a choice, however, about how to
understand the nature of the creativity and ethical commitments that constitute
her utopianism. I will argue that one of her options is to better accommodate
the insights of West's and MacKinnon's work while remaining faithful to her
own commitments, both epistemological and ethical.
I. A SKETCH OF BEYOND ACCOMMODATION
A. The Argument Against the Essentialization of Motherhood: West and
Kristeva, Lacan and Chodorow
Mention womanhood and many people are likely to immediately think of
motherhood. It is, therefore, unsurprising that efforts to describe what is most
essential about women or women's experience have often turned toward one
or another aspect of mothering. Cornell argues that Robin West's use of
motherhood presents a fairly simple version of essentialism, as does the object
relations theory that is often associated with the work of Nancy Chodorow.
Cornell prefers the work of French feminist Julia Kristeva, which is based on
the psychoanalytic theories of Jacques Lacan. But even these more
sophisticated efforts ultimately devolve into essentialism.
Cornell defines essentialism as "map[ping] the feminine onto femaleness. "2
In other words, essentialism makes the claim that whatever it is that makes a
person female (an identifiable member of a particular gender) will also
necessarily create in that person certain psychological or experiential
characteristics (femininity, however defined).' This definition leaves open the
possibility of both biologically based essentialism-where what makes one
female is certain physical structures or capacities, like having a uterus that can
gestate a fetus-and non-biological essentialism-where what makes one female
is occupying a certain social or cultural role, like mothering.
2. P. 26.
3. For alternative definitions of essentialism in feminist theory, see ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN,
INESSENTIAL WOMAN ix (1988) ("an essential 'womanness' that all women have and share in common
despite the racial, class, religious, ethnic, and cultural differences among us"); Angela P. Harris, Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (gender essentialism is "the
notion that a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race,
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience").
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Given this definition, Cornell categorizes Robin West as an essentialist.
According to Cornell, West posits a female nature that generates the shared
feminine experience upon which the feminist legal critique is based.4 She links
West's approach to object relations theory in psychoanalysis,' which argues
that the process of being mothered by women generates systematic differences
in the sense of self and relation developed by male and female children.6 In
object relations theory, a male child's sense of self is founded on difference
and separation from the primary caretaker, who is female. The female child,
on the other hand, can continue to feel connected to her mother without risking
her sense of gender identity. As a result, women grow up with a more
connected sense of self in which separation is the great threat, while men grow
up with a more autonomous sense of self in which losing one's clear
boundaries is the great threat.7 While Cornell is very sympathetic to the
practical goal served by West's essentialism, she is extremely suspicious of
the epistemological underpinnings of such a position. According to Cornell,
West believes that she must give expression to female experience in order to
articulate the harms to women that are presently obscured by our legal and
cultural categories.8 Cornell agrees that women's experience must be
expressed, but argues that one cannot rely on some natural, essential Woman
to ground this experience. Such a foundation is unavailable once we recognize
that language is not a mirror, reflecting a given reality, but that reality is itself
a social artifact, created, in part, by the language we use to describe it. In
other words, the interpretation that is an inevitable aspect of knowledge
formation is deeply permeated by the cultural values and concepts encoded in
the language through which that knowledge is expressed. 9 If essentialism
requires that we reach behind language to some preexisting essential reality
about women," ° then it rests on a view of language that Cornell believes has
been discredited. 1
Cornell finds a more appealing approach in the work of French feminist
Julia Kristeva. Kristeva also relies on mothering to define the feminine, but
4. Pp. 25-26. Cornell recognizes the ambiguity over whether West is a biological essentialist. Id.
5. P. 6.
6. Pp. 50-52.
7. See generally NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1989); NANCY
J. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978). Robin West refers to the male side of this
experience as the official story of liberal legalism, and to the female side of this experience as the official
story of cultural feminism. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 37 (1988).
8. P. 21.
9. For a fuller explication of this argument, see RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF
NATURE 129-312 (1979); Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J.
63, 68-72 (1993).
10. See Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 87
(questioning whether the denial of "a concrete, given, natural, precultural self" matches women's
experience); id. at 95 ("The critical female self knows herself as a fantastic, unlived, unspeakable, unspoken
alternative .... This anti-symbolic, uncultured, natural, loving, female self knows herself ... as one
who must be reclaimed from denial, fear, oppression and loathing.").
11. P. 29.
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she grounds her analysis in the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan rather
than in object relations theory. Lacan suggests that linguistic consciousness and
identity are produced in the infant's process of separation from the Mother.
This process generates both loss (of the infant's sense of primordial connection
to the world) and gain (of a place in the symbolic order by which human
beings give meaning to the world). The symbolic order is represented by the
phallus and, through its association with the penis, by the Father. The loss or
lack is represented by the Mother. For Kristeva, the activity of mothering
allows women to heal the primordial loss by becoming mothers themselves. 12
Cornell sees some serious difficulties with Kristeva's approach, and indeed
with the Lacanian theory on which it is based, but she thinks it is ultimately
preferable to object relations theory and to West's approach. Kristeva slips into
essentialism by tying maternity and the feminine too closely to a biological
capacity.13 Nonetheless, Cornell believes that Kristeva's approach allows for
change and for male participation in the feminine in a way that object relations
theory does not. Because object relations theory reduces psychic structure to
social relations, Cornell argues that it sets up two different, indeed
incommensurate, realities for men and women 4 and makes it difficult to see
how change could gain a foothold. "5 Cornell believes that Lacan, on the other
hand, can explain why men might want to change the social order that appears
to be in their favor: they pay for their dominant role with castration (i.e.,
subjection to the Father, the law, the symbolic order).16 Moreover, the basic
experience of separation is very similar for both men and women, creating
some meaningful psychic common ground. And, finally, the process of
mothering-through which the rift is healed-is, in theory, available to men
as well as women.
Despite these advantages, however, Kristeva and West both falter in
Cornell's view because of their reliance on motherhood as the central
experience of femininity. Cornell points out that this focus ignores the fact that
not all women mother and that, even among those women who do, motherhood
does not mean the same thing to everyone. Indeed, unwanted pregnancies and
issues of class and race, among other factors, can change the meaning of
motherhood significantly.' 7
This inability to recognize the diversity of female experience arises from
the deeper failure of these theories: dereliction. This concept, which is central
to Cornell's critique, points to the capture of a discourse by the masculine
symbolic order.' 8 In dereliction, an attempt to challenge and escape from a
12. P. 43.
13. Id.
14. Pp. 52.
15. Pp. 51-52.
16. Pp. 52-53.
17. Pp. 57-59.
18. The symbolic order is masculine because it represents the world as seen from a male-gendered
perspective: woman stands for lack or loss and the phallus represents the symbolic order which gives
[Vol. 5: 289
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dominant conceptual system results in recapture by that system. Dereliction
leaves women unable to understand themselves except through the masculine
perspective institutionalized in that order.19 By relying on motherhood as
central to femininity, (which is, of course, the primary way in which men see
women in either a Lacanian or an object relations scheme) both Kristeva and
West have succumbed to dereliction. They have cast women in the role
designated by the masculine order, whether that is the role of nurturer or the
role of representative of a lost, pre-symbolic state of connection. By accepting
such a role they have foreclosed the option of a new fantasy of gender
relations.20
B. MacKinnon and the Denial of the Feminine
One might attempt to avoid this dereliction by eschewing the project of
defining any positive conception of the feminine. Refusing to embrace the
feminine, whether or not it is defined by motherhood, ensures that one cannot
be co-opted into endorsing some version of present gender relations in the
guise of an ideal of femininity. This is the path adopted by Catharine
MacKinnon. Unfortunately, according to Cornell, this approach also falls
victim to a form of essentialism and dereliction.
Unlike the object relations theorists, MacKinnon does not accept the old
"language as mirror" epistemology. Instead, she whole-heartedly embraces the
view that there is no reality outside of our conceptual systems, no external
standard which we can use as a benchmark for truth. Femininity, then, simply
is whatever it is within our present system of gender relations. And that
present system is fundamentally a system of gender oppression. Thus, to affirm
femininity is to be complicit in our own subordination."
Cornell sees this position as essentialist because it completely equates
femaleness with femininity. For MacKinnon, to be female is to occupy the
subordinate position in the gender hierarchy; thus, the feminine is defined by
subordination. This use of some aspect of present existence (subordination) to
define the feminine denies that concept any transformative power. The
feminine is completely captured by the existing systems of meaning. This
reduction of the potential to the actual is the heart of essentialism for
Cornell.22
MacKinnon's refusal to search for an ideal or look beyond the present
system of gender relations creates other difficulties in addition to essentialism.
She carefully avoids endorsing any alternative image of gender relations as an
ideal toward which we should move, preferring a pragmatic or "realist"
meaning. Women are objects rather than subjects in this scheme. See pp. 37-40.
19. P. 74.
20. P. 63.
21. Pp. 120-25.
22. P. 126.
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approach.' But without such an ethical ideal, Cornell contends, MacKinnon's
argument is robbed of much of its critical edge. MacKinnon does, of course,
have an implicit ideal that guides her criticism: an ideal of freedom in
comparison with which she is able to say that the present gender hierarchy is
wrong and that women should have more power.24 This critique is limited,
however; it leaves the hierarchy in place and simply advocates that we struggle
for position within it.' 5 MacKinnon has no critical perspective from which
to challenge the underlying arrangement in which gender is defined in terms
of unequal power relationships. Such a challenge, Cornell contends, could
never come from within that patriarchal system. It would need to come from
those perspectives excluded by the system; that is, from the feminine that
MacKinnon rejects.26 Without such a challenge, feminism becomes
revenge-an attempt to reverse the hierarchy and put women on top-rather
than the reconstruction of gender into some non-hierarchical form.7
Finally, MacKinnon's reluctance to embrace the feminine leads her to yet
another failure. Shorn of any basis for an alternative, she is left to rely on the
concept of the subject or self embedded in the masculine symbolic order. This
concept sees the self as fundamentally inviolable, having firm boundaries that
cannot be penetrated without violence to the subject. MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin adopt this view of the self in their descriptions of heterosexual
intercourse in order to explain the danger, damage, and humiliation of "being
fucked." They argue that being fucked violates your very personhood, because
to be a person is, most fundamentally, to be "unfuckable."
This vision of the self is, of course, deeply gendered. As Cornell points
out, there are other ways to understand the penetration of one's boundaries
besides as violation. Selfhood could also be understood as encompassing a
receptivity to otherness in which interpenetration is seen as potentially joyful
rather than threatening.2 8 Once again, by refusing to explore the feminine,
MacKinnon has left herself with no option but to accept the conception of the
self generated by the present, masculine, symbolic system.
Thus, Cornell argues, this effort to abandon the feminine entirely does not
lead away from essentialism and dereliction, but back to them. MacKinnon has
essentialized femininity by limiting its possible definitions to what it is within
the masculine perspective which constructs our reality. She has, therefore,
been captured by that perspective, unable to escape its definition of gender as
a power hierarchy or its definition of the self as inviolable. This dereliction
leaves her without the critical and ethical foundation on which to construct an
23. P. 130.
24. P. 129.
25. P. 132.
26. P. 130.
27. Pp. 130-33.
28. Pp. 153-55.
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alternative view of gender and the self, because such a foundation must come
from the feminine.29
Ill. FEMINISM, DECONSTRUCTION, AND UTOPIANISM
How, then, to escape the trap of dereliction, as well as the danger of
essentialism, and avoid abandoning the feminine altogether? Cornell argues
that deconstruction provides the key because it recognizes the unfinished and
disruptive element in all linguistic and conceptual systems. Deconstruction,
therefore, opens the door to a type of feminine writing that challenges the
present system of gender relations on the basis of an ethic of justice and a new
choreography of sexual difference.
Deconstruction "has been variously presented as a philosophical position,
a political or intellectual strategy, a mode of reading" or a technique of literary
criticism.3" It is closely associated with the work of Jacques Derrida.
Although any attempt to define deconstruction would itself be subject to a
deconstructive critique,3 I will risk a brief explication that seeks only to help
in understanding Cornell's use of deconstruction. In deconstruction, a text is
examined in order to demonstrate its gaps and contradictions .32
"[D]econstruction is the vigilant seeking-out of those 'aporias', blindspots or
moments of self-contradiction where a text involuntarily betrays the tension
between rhetoric and logic, between what it manifestly means to say and what
it is nonetheless constrained to mean."" This technique identifies that which
is excluded or suppressed by a text or philosophy and shows how the
hegemony of the text34 or philosophy relies on that suppression or
exclusion.35 "Derridean deconstruction exposes the limit of any system of
ideality established as reality, whether that limit be evoked as the supplement,
the margin, . . . or indeed as Woman. "36
In the context of Cornell's argument, deconstruction helps us to see that,
however rich our symbolic system and however powerful the institutions that
support it, we are never completely captured in the way MacKinnon
suggests.37 Our difficulty-and for Cornell also our salvation-lies in the fact
29. P. 164 ("If we do not bring the 'feminine' reality from the 'rere' to the front, we will be
imprisoned in the genderized reality that MacKinnon so eloquently describes, in which everywhere we look,
we find the man.").
30. JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 85
,(1982). But see CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, DERRIDA 18 (1987) (asserting that, according to Derrida,
deconstruction is neither a method, technique, nor type of critique).
31. See NORRIS, supra note 30, at 19-20.
32. See Rodolphe Gasche, Infrastructures and Systematicity, in DECONSTRUCTION AND PHILOSOPHY
3, 4 (John Sallis ed., 1987).
33. NORRIS, supra note 30, at 19.
34. By "hegemony of the text," I mean the way in which the text claims to be or tries to be supreme
or complete-to tell the whole story.
35. See CULLER, supra note 30, at 86.
36. P. 18.
37. P. 107 (subject is neverjust hostage of its surroundings because they can never form an unshakable
1993]
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that language, and particularly metaphorical language, inevitably contains a
surplus of meaning through which prescription and interpretation enter.38 In
other words, to apply a conceptual category to something is to make a
prescriptive claim about it, to assert that it belongs in a certain place in our
conceptual scheme.39 That claim has normative assumptions and implications
in many cases. For example, asserting that "'Man' is a rational animal"
assumes, among other things, that it is both meaningful and desirable to
distinguish reason from emotion, and implies both that women are somehow
less human than men and that rationality is the most important characteristic
that distinguishes human beings from other animals. All of these are
controversial normative claims. Moreover, this reading is only one of many
possible interpretations. Deconstruction shows us how language is constantly
open to such reinterpretation and normative challenge.
It is not possible to resolve these normative and interpretive clashes by
referring to some reality behind and independent of language, like nature or
biology.' Cornell agrees with Derrida that "'there are only contexts, that
nothing exists outside context . . . but also that the limit of the frame or the
border of the context always entails a clause of non-closure.'" 4' In other
words, knowledge is a human activity that takes place only within social and
conceptual systems; we can never step outside of those systems to acquire
some knowledge that is true in a more universal or transcendent sense.
Nonetheless, every social and conceptual system has limits, a border in time
or space beyond which other systems, other contexts apply. Thus, we are
never totally captured by the systems we inhabit because they are subject to
invasion and transformation. There is nothing outside of culture, but no one
culture can capture the universe and make itself immune to disruption.
All of this has implications for the Lacanian theory. Lacan sees Woman
as the symbolic order makes her-the representation of lack or loss-but, in
fact, the concept of Woman as Mother disrupts that order and can never be
totally captured by it.42 Indeed, Woman is deeply subversive of the symbolic
order, being a kind of gateway through which the unspoken and unspeakable,
the repressed, can rise up to challenge the order.43
The claim, then, is that nothing exists outside of symbolic systems, and
yet these systems are constantly open to reinterpretation and disruption. One
difficulty with this claim is that it seems to suggest that reality is whatever we
reality that limits subject to what is).
38. P. 168 (quoting JULIA KRISTEVA, HISTOIRES D'AMOUR 254 (1983)).
39. P. 31.
40. P. 83.
41. P. 170 (quoting Derrida).
42. Pp. 79-81.
43. Pp. 36-42. This idea is Derrida's central critique of Lacan. See pp. 79-81. This point is also used
by Cornell to criticize object relations theory. She believes that object relations theorists make the mistake
of accepting the psychic structure generated by child-rearing practices as a context without a border, without
considering the possibility of its disruption from the outside. See p. 107.
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create it to be through our interpretations and reinterpretations. Could we then
simply eliminate gender oppression by "reinterpreting" our situation? Cornell
explicitly denies this implication. "Our oppression is not a fiction" but it is
also not all of reality." She insists that "reference" does not disappear
entirely; we must tie our revolutionary interpretations to "'reality.'"'s
At this point in the argument, Cornell parts company with Derrida. While
Derrida dreams of an understanding of nonsexual difference, Cornell argues
that we must begin from the present situation of sexual difference and affirm
the feminine.' A gender neutral approach is ineffective in her view because
no sexually neutral position is available within our system of gender
identity.47 Our present system is one of hierarchy and in order to challenge
it, there must be a stage of overturning that hierarchy."' This cannot be done
if we ignore gender categories altogether. Thus, the challenges and
reinterpretations posed by feminism must include an affirmation of the
feminine.
The great value of deconstruction for feminism arises because, in Cornell's
view, the deconstructive approach rests, ultimately, on an ethical insight that
points to a utopian ideal. The ethical insight is that justice involves recognizing
the claims of those who are excluded by the categories of our present symbolic
system; justice is bringing the outsider in.49 Therefore, practicing
deconstruction (understood as the process of undermining existing symbolic
categories by bringing to the surface the excluded and suppressed) is doing
justice, and justice is the ethical force behind deconstruction.50 When seen
from this perspective, the denial of new possibilities and new interpretations
is revealed as a political and moral act rather than simply an epistemological
position-an act that is fundamentally unjust."' Deconstruction is utopian in
that it points to the inevitable beyond; it asks us about the "not yet of the never
has been" through which justice is gradually, if always imperfectly,
actualized.52 Feminism needs this utopian orientation, Cornell argues, if it
is to be more than simply a reversal of power in the gender hierarchy. 1
Cornell advocates using a particular kind of feminine writing to incorporate
this utopian ideal into feminism. The writing is feminine because it explicitly
attempts to affirm the feminine rather than to seek some gender-neutral
standard or ideal. It is utopian, in the deconstructive sense, because it
44. P. 82. See also p. 118.
45. P. 82.
46. Pp. 99-100.
47. P. 93.
48. Pp. 95-96. Cornell asserts that this phase is structural rather than temporal. We will never pass
out of this stage completely because the hierarchy will continually reassert itself, but we can move beyond
it in our theorizing.
49. P. 109.
50. Pp. 111-15.
51. P. 109.
52. P. 112.
53. P. 116.
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challenges the present system of gender identity by reinterpreting gender,
imagining it in a new way that brings in the excluded and suppressed. Cornell
argues that this kind of writing is often created in the reinterpretation and
retelling of myths that speak to the significance of Woman. These myths are
part of the symbolic order into which we are thrown, the context in which we
find ourselves, but they are also metaphors that offer a foothold for
transformation. Cornell, therefore, suggests that we think of "the feminine as
allegory. " 4
Cornell concludes by asserting that, since feminism is all about this utopian
re-imagining, it must reject accommodation of the existing symbolic order.
Repudiating the feminine is, she believes, part of that symbolic order; indeed,
one of the few constants across human cultures with gender hierarchy is that
they devalue whatever is defined as feminine."5 Thus, to join in that
repudiation would be to succumb to dereliction, to accommodate once again.56
Moving beyond accommodation means embracing the feminine, not as an
essentialist category, but as a doorway to otherness, disruption, and justice.
Only through an acceptance of otherness, only through the welcoming of the
other as other, only through justice, can we approach love.57
II. A RESPONSE
I believe that Cornell has put her finger on a central problem in
contemporary feminist theory and has offered a creative and valuable solution.
My assessment of her work is, therefore, more in the form of a friendly
amendment than a critique. I think she can more effectively achieve some of
her own goals by modifying her analysis of West and MacKinnon and by
filling in some of the ambiguous aspects of her own position.
Cornell recognizes that her approach cannot be a complete solution to the
problems she describes, nor does she intend it as such. She explicitly
acknowledges the value of other, complementary projects in feminist theory,
including "the articulation of the determinate situation of women within our
legal and political context, and ... the genealogical exposure of how we are
formed as objects within the masculine symbolic."58 The first of these
projects is a reasonable description of much of Robin West's work, and the
second of Catharine MacKinnon's.
Cornell wants to deny that her own project excludes these others, or vice
versa, because she sees value in them all. Unfortunately, her descriptions of
54. P. 107. In other words, Cornell proposes that "the feminine" is not biology or psychology or
sociology, but rather a matter of symbolism and interpretation.
55. P. 9.
56. Pp. 204-05.
57. Pp. 173-78 (describing feminist writers' attempts to break through to an acceptance of otherness
on which romantic love could be founded).
58. P. 171.
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West and MacKinnon suggest that accepting her assumptions necessarily leads
to discrediting these other two approaches. While I believe that many of
Cornell's criticisms are both valid and important, I also think that she can be
more open to the insights of these other theorists without jeopardizing her own
project.
Moreover, if Cornell's brand of ethical feminism is to be a viable
alternative, or even a supplement, to existing theories, there are some further
questions she must address. It is not yet clear to me how Cornell's own
approach escapes the problems of essentialism and dereliction that she
identifies in other theories. Depending on how she addresses those issues,
West's and MacKinnon's approaches will look more or less plausible as
complementary projects. My suggestion is that the general direction in which
Cornell should further develop her own approach is one that accommodates
the important insights of these other feminist theorists.
A. Robin West and Object Relations Theory
Cornell associates West with the object relations school of psychoanalytic
theory. This school of thought, most clearly represented in the work of Nancy
Chodorow, suggests that identity is set early in childhood through a process
in which the child makes his or her relationships with others into the internal,
psychological objects through which it identifies itself.59 In societies where
the primary caretaker is almost always a woman, boys and girls will follow
rather different paths in this process of identity formation. For boys, this
process will involve a necessary and fundamental separation from the female
mother." Indeed, their masculine identity must be defined not only as
separate from but in opposition to the feminine mother. Girls, on the other
hand, do not need such a radical separation. Because they share their gender
identity with their mothers, they can continue to feel connected, can continue
to blur the boundary between self and other, without risking their sense of
identity.6 '
There are several objections to the arguments Cornell raises against object
relations theory. First, this theory is not as simplistically dichotomous as
Cornell suggests. It is possible to believe that the female gender of the primary
caretaker creates different experiences of self for male and female children
without seeing those different experiences as an unbridgeable chasm. The
gendered identities represent two different models, certainly, but many people
have elements of both. Those mixtures may create tensions and inconsistencies,
59. See NANCY CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 148-49 (1989).
60. See Sandra Harding, Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality?, 36 DIALECTICA 225,
234 (1982).
61. For other variations on this argument, see E.F. KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE
108-12 (1985); M. Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist
Historical Materialism, in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 157, 168 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987).
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but consistency has never been the hallmark of human character. The theory
points to meaningful differences that correlate with gender; it does not,
however, require that there be no points of overlap in actual persons.
In addition, object relations theory does indicate why men would have an
incentive to change a system of patriarchy that seems to favor them. The
process of acquiring and defending the separated identity of a "man" in this
theory is an extremely painful one. Male identity, unlike the female sense of
self, is seen as constantly under attack, very fragile, and thus a source of great
anxiety.62 It is, moreover, a barrier to the kind of closeness that all human
beings need and desire. Thus, men have an incentive to change the social
institutions that leave them anxious and lonely.
Finally, Cornell criticizes object relations theory for making gender identity
and gender hierarchy seem rigid and unchangeable. She believes that Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory is more flexible and hopeful. It is true that object
relations theory reduces psychic structure to a product of social structure, but
I think that makes it more hopeful rather than less so. Social structure,
particularly the institution of female mothering, is something we can change.
Indeed, there has been some small but meaningful alteration already in the
degree to which men act as caretakers for children.63 The Lacanian view of
gender identity, on the other hand, is much less amenable to change.
Patriarchy itself would have to be wiped out before men and women would
stop associating women with lack and men with the symbolic order. And when
we finally reach the end of patriarchy, the dynamic of separation and linguistic
consciousness may require that someone other than women take the role of
representative of that lost connectedness, simply substituting some other type
of hierarchy for patriarchy. Lacanian theory seems to suggest that hierarchy
is inherent in the very nature of human consciousness. I agree that there
are difficulties with object relations theory, but I do not believe that the
comparison of these two approaches yields such a clear conclusion in favor
of Lacanian theory.
62. See West, supra note 10, at 87-88.
63. 1 think some of the best evidence for this cultural shift may be found in the increasing frequency
with which men are portrayed as caring for young children on television commercials. See, e.g., television
commercials for Osco Pharmacy, Velveta cheese, Nestle's Toll House chocolate morsels, Prudential
Insurance. This is not to say that men are sharing equally in child care responsibilities, but only that some
part of the next generation of children may grow up thinking of their fathers as caretakers along with their
mothers.
64. See Mary Jo Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARv.
L. REV. 1045, 1070 (1992) ("[A] fundamental premise of post-Freudian, Lacanian theories of self [is] the
premise that domination and subordination are an inevitable aspect of human relations."). This inevitability
arises from the nature of linguistic consciousness. In order for linguistic consciousness to occur, we must
separate from the prelinguistic connectedness. A hierarchy is generated because language is always
suppressing this never-quite-vanquished sense of something lost. If it is necessary to have a "signifier" for
that loss, and if it is necessary that the signifier be another person (so that our relationship with her can
be a constant reminder of the connection we have lost), then it would seem that Lacanian theory suggests
that human hierarchy is an inevitable concomitant of linguistic consciousness.
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It is also unclear to me why Cornell favors Lacanian theory over object
relations theory, given that she ultimately embraces a deconstructive version
of Woman that undermines the Lacanian reading. Cornell cannot accept object
relations theory as the whole story, of course, because it does not leave much
room for alternative interpretations of gender identity, but she could certainly
recognize it as one part of a complex system of identity creation. I believe that
she is unwilling to do so because this theory suggests that social structure
generates the normative conceptual systems (i.e., the "is" generates the
"ought"). In other words, our normative imagination is limited by the reality
of our existing culture. Such a causal ordering violates the creative utopianism
that she wants to recommend. As I will suggest in the final section, however,
the complex nature of that creativity should-indeed, I think, must-leave room
for many different types of relationship between "is" and "ought. "65
Furthermore, it is not clear to me that West's work should be categorized
as part of the object relations school at all. West focuses far more on events
later in life as central to the development of women's connected sense of self:
menstruation, sexual intercourse, pregnancy, lactation and breast feeding.66
These occur far too late to be included in the pre-Oedipal object relations stage
of development. Moreover, Chodorow and other object relations theorists tend
to emphasize the social institution of female mothering as the source of the
gender differentiated sense of self, while West tends to emphasize the
biological capacity to mother as the source. These differences indicate that
West is not in any simple sense an object relations theorist.
It would, on the other hand, also be a mistake to treat West as a simple
biological essentialist. She has written that biology is destiny only if we are
unaware of it; 67 that is, biology never comes to us straight up, it is always
refracted through culture. It is only if we are not self-conscious about our
particular culture's vision of biology that we will be unable to escape it.
West is one of the few people who does not shy away from the label
"essentialist" so there is little point in arguing that she is not one. Nonetheless,
I think there is reason to believe that West's form of essentialism is not as
threatening to Cornell's project as the label might imply. West suggests that
there is some presocial reality to which we can refer as a normative standard
by which to critique our society's description of the self.6 This position must,
to some extent, commit her to the old "language as mirror" epistemology that
is directly in conflict with the assumptions of the deconstructive approach
Cornell endorses. West has added an interesting twist to this approach,
however: she argues that we can maintain our skepticism about particular
claims to knowledge or truth without embracing an explicitly anti-essentialist
65. See infra note 105.
66. See West, supra note 7, at 20-25.
67. See id. at 71.
68. See West, supra note 10, 96.
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position.69 In other words, we may believe that there is an objective reality,
a truth of the matter, about women's nature or human nature, but we do not
believe that anyone has undistorted access to that truth. The result is a
commitment to keep searching, never to rest easy with our present answers.
If that commitment to the provisional, unfinished nature of our knowledge is
made explicit,7' then West's essentialism might well leave room for the
constant challenge so central to Cornell's ethical vision.
What is at stake for Cornell in her rejection of West's approach? I believe
that both writers share a desire to give substance and detail to the ideal of the
feminine and to embrace that ideal. The central difference seems to be that
Cornell wants that process to proceed through imagination and creation, while
West sees it as fundamentally a process of description of an already existing
reality. In other words, West sees a presocial, natural reality generating the
normative standard for critique, while Cornell wants the normative standard
(an ethical commitment to Otherness) to generate a reinterpretation of our
cultural constructs. (For Cornell, the "ought" must generate the "is" rather
than the reverse.) As with object relations theory, it is the creative element of
Cornell's utopianism that is disturbed by West's approach.
B. Catharine MacKinnon
Although I believe that Cornell's criticisms of MacKinnon are more damaging
than her critique of West, there are once again aspects of MacKinnon's work
that can and should be salvaged. As with West and object relations theory,
however, such a reconciliation between MacKinnon's and Cornell's approaches
is made more difficult by the particular view Cornell seems to have adopted
of the nature of creativity, the relationship between "is" and "ought."
The heart of Cornell's critique of MacKinnon is that we are not so totally
captured by our dominant culture as MacKinnon suggests. Cornell points out
two specific difficulties arising from MacKinnon's position. First, such total
capture robs MacKinnon of an ideal she can use to criticize the existing system
of gender hierarchy, leaving her merely struggling for position within it.
Second, total capture means that MacKinnon must adopt the masculine vision
of the self as impermeable, as having fixed and inviolable boundaries. While
both of these arguments are insightful and important, they do not justify
rejecting MacKinnon's approach entirely.
It is true that MacKinnon refuses to endorse a picture of gender relations
toward which we should strive or an image of feminine identity undistorted
by gender hierarchy. In that sense she does, indeed, seek to avoid the use of
ideals in her arguments. But ideals can take forms other than imaginative
reconstructions; they can also take the form of principles or fundamental
69. See id. at 96-97.
70. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 881-87 (1990).
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commitments. When those forms are considered, it is plain that MacKinnon
has some ideals and that they are in fact the basis for her critique of
patriarchy. Cornell recognizes this when she attributes an ideal of freedom to
MacKinnon. Just because MacKinnon refuses to describe an alternative system
of gender relations does not mean that she is unable to criticize the existing
one. It is true that one can have no basis for critique without some ethical
commitment, but it is not true that one is similarly disabled by the lack of an
idealized goal or endpoint. MacKinnon's normative resources are sufficient
to show, first, how our system is violating its own professed ideals (or,
perhaps more accurately, how those ideals are defined in ways that undermine
their professed meanings) and second, how our system of gender hierarchy
violates the implicit norms of freedom and non-domination she brings to
bear.7 Cornell is correct that MacKinnon cannot, or will not, tell us what
to put in its place, but she has, of course, made many suggestions for specific
changes that will improve the system.72 I think the problem is not that
MacKinnon has no ethical ideals to guide her critique, but that, in Cornell's
view, she has the wrong ones.
This substantive disagreement surfaces in Cornell's second criticism: that
MacKinnon has adopted a masculine and limiting view of the self as inviolable.
This is an extremely valuable insight, and one that should move us to search
our own experience for alternative models of the self. But it should not blind
us to the element of truth in the masculine model that MacKinnon adopts.
A self with impermeable boundaries is subject to a variety of destructive
patterns of thought and behavior, but so is a self with boundaries that are too
permeable. First, the danger of such permeable boundaries can be seen in the
pain that led many women to join consciousness raising groups and engage in
the difficult search for selves that had been lost or suppressed. Moreover, the
valuing of a permeable subject can mask destructive self-sacrifice. First, it can
be used by others to support a demand for sacrifice, as men have traditionally
demanded of women.73 Second, women may use it themselves to excuse
other-directed action that is actually an attempt to defuse domination. For
example, the danger of expropriation by violent male sexuality may lead
women to define their boundaries as more permeable so as to avoid feeling
violated.74 Finally, some feminists have suggested that knowledge, as well
as love, are only possible if the self retains some separation from the other,
albeit a less distant and unbridgeable space than in the masculine view.75 The
71. See generally, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
72. See id. at 81-214 (discussing rape law, abortion law, sexual harassment, and pornography).
73. See JEAN GRIMSHAW, PHILOSOPHY AND FEMINIST THINKING 104-05 (1986).
74. Robin West makes this point with respect to defining oneself as "giving": if you give something
away freely, then you need not feel violated when someone takes it from you. See Robin West, The
Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wisc.
WOMEN'S L. J. 81, 93-94 (1987). 1 believe that the same dynamic may apply to the sense of permeable
boundaries that leaves one open to expropriation.
75. See KELLER, supra note 61, at 99.
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primordial soup in which all distinctions are erased is a medium in which
neither love nor knowledge has any meaning.
Cornell recognizes that the extreme opposite of fundamental separation-
the inability to distinguish self and other-is dangerous. It is only in the
masculine imagination that mother and child are bonded in a primordial unity;
feminine writing shows the otherness as well as the connection in
motherhood.76 Indeed, the most basic ethical impulse in Cornell's work is to
let the Other be the Other, to ensure that violence to identity is not imposed
as the price of connection.' Thus, MacKinnon's emphasis on
boundaries-while incomplete and distorted if offered as a total vision of the
self-is consistent with an important element in Cornell's own approach. I
think that Cornell could appreciate it for this role, even while she points out
its shortcomings.
Thus, the two specific problems that arise from MacKinnon's lack of an
ideal of the feminine are not, in fact, insuperable. It is, instead, the underlying
structure of her approach that is the central difficulty from Cornell's point of
view. MacKinnon, like the others Cornell criticizes, does not appear to leave
room for the type of creative reimagining that Cornell sees as essential to the
deconstructive feminist project. For MacKinnon, masculine ideology is reality,
and we are the products of that reality. There is none of the open-textured
quality of metaphor through which the suppressed can slip into our
consciousness. MacKinnon believes that the reality of our conceptual system
generates the ideals that we can bring to bear, and that MacKinnon, therefore,
keeps to a minimum. As a result, the feminine can mean nothing except what
it means in the dominant, masculine, conceptual system, so that Cornell's
creative utopianism seem impossible.
C. Deconstruction and Creative Utopianism
Cornell's primary concern in this book is to show that feminism cannot
repudiate the feminine, but must, instead, affirm and transform it. I have
tremendous sympathy for this project as a pragmatic matter. As Cornell points
out, we live in a society marked by gender distinction and hierarchy. If we do
not affirm the feminine, we do not thereby avoid being shaped by it; rather,
we simply abandon this inevitable aspect of our identity to the devaluation
imposed by a masculine system. At least while our society continues to be so
deeply gender-based and misogynist," a part of the feminist project must be
76. P. 22.
77. P. 113.
78. 1 am intentionally leaving open the possibility that the ultimate goal is an androgynous society in
which gender is simply not an important distinction, not a significant aspect of identity. See Richard A.
Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 581, 603-15 (1977). 1 do not think it is necessary to reject androgyny as a goal in order to recognize
the practical importance of affirming the feminine under our present circumstances.
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to give women a positive way of understanding what it means to be a woman.
This project is crucial both psychologically and politically.
Cornell wants to take this argument a step further and say that affirming
the feminine is also crucial theoretically: it is required to avoid essentialism
and dereliction. Here too, I am sympathetic. These are two of the most
pressing problems in the development of feminist theory and it is extremely
important to discover ways of avoiding or minimizing them. In order for
Cornell's approach to solve those problems, however, there are some vague
points that must be clarified and difficulties that must be ironed out. In
discussing those problems, I will first mention a couple of concerns about the
potential essentialism of affirming the feminine. Then I will turn to the more
difficult issues surrounding dereliction. I do not pretend to have an answer as
to how to avoid dereliction, but I see at least two different paths that Cornell
could take to find such an answer. Only one of those paths leaves room for
the other projects that she says she values, the projects that West and
MacKinnon (among others) are pursuing and which I believe are crucial to
feminism.
There is a more general and a more specific problem involved in
essentialism. The general problem is that essentialist theories of Woman tend
to create rigid gender roles and identities that are used to repress and limit
women and that exclude the experience of many actual women. The more
specific problem is that the people most often excluded by such theories are
usually the people at the bottom of the social hierarchy because of their race,
class, religion, sexual orientation, or physical disability. In other words, the
exclusions are systematic rather than arbitrary and they mimic the other types
of oppression in our culture.
The more general problem of essentialism arises for Cornell because the
metaphors through which the reinterpretation and affirmation of the feminine
take place can create a gender identity that may be new, but is so rigid that
it closes off deconstructive utopianism.79 This danger is, I think, fairly well
addressed in Cornell's book. According to Cornell, essentialist foreclosure can
be avoided by feminine writing "as long as the attempt to specify the feminine
is understood as proceeding through a process of remetaphorization that never
fully captures Woman. There is always more to write. " ° After all, if we
keep in mind that we are "imagining, not describing," 8' then we should not
be surprised that the process is endless and subject to constant variation.
Cornell concludes that "to affirm[,] that in a bipolarized society of gender
identity, Woman signifies, particularly through myths, does not mean that the
feminine can be reduced to a set of shared characteristics or properties."82
79. P. 167.
80. P. 171.
81. P. 179.
82. P. 195.
1993]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
This is, of course, no guarantee that the representations of Woman
generated by feminine writing will not be used as an essentialist weapon
against women. It is precisely the threat of such misuse that has caused many
feminists to be wary of affirming the feminine, particularly through the
medium of existing cultural materials like myths. Cornell neither shies away
from this danger nor minimizes it. Her answer-that the misuse is not inherent
in her approach and that the gain is worth the risk-is, I think, the only answer
available to any theorist. She cannot offer a guarantee because no guarantees
exist. Any theory with enough power to be useful can also be misused. The
most that we can ask, up front, is that the misuse not be inevitable-necessary
to the very benefit we hope to gain from the theory-and that the benefit
appear to be worth the risk. 3
On the more specific problem with essentialism, I think Cornell needs to
say more. The danger is that the mythic reconstructions she endorses may
ignore the real and meaningful differences among women, making the
experience of only a subset of privileged women into the touchstone for
Woman." Cornell argues that if we recognize that the universal in a myth is
always told through and in the particular context, then we will see that the
different contexts occupied by various women in our society will generate new
interpretations of those myths."5 There is, in other words, no universal to
essentialize that exists outside of particular women's experiences and retellings.
Certainly this response leaves the door open to interpretations by women
who are traditionally excluded, but I wonder if a trace of essentialism remains.
Essentialism may creep into this deconstructive feminism subtly through the
use of myth itself. Cornell suggests that the special value in the process of
reinterpretation of myth-as opposed to writing fiction generally-lies in the
constancy of myth, which allows it to function as a source of deep meaning
and significance. 6 That constancy, and therefore the power of the retelling
of a myth, arises largely from the repetition and familiarity of the original
versions. If Cornell is advocating the reinterpretation of myth as the primary
mechanism for affirming the feminine, then she may be asking all women in
our society to express their experiences through the myths that are a part of
familiar, mainstream culture. They can, of course, reinterpret those myths in
light of their own subcultures and experiences, but the basic framework would
come from the dominant cultural tradition. 87
83. It then becomes a practical and empirical question whether we have estimated the usefulness and
danger accurately. On this issue, people can and do disagree with Cornell about the strategic value of
affirming the feminine. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 813-
20 (1989) (describing the misuse of images of femininity, including EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628
F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. I11. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988)).
84. P. 194.
85. See p. 195.
86. Pp. 172-73.
87. Cornell provides examples of the use of the Medea myth in TONI MORRISON, BELOVED (1987)
and CHRISTA WOLF, CASSANDRA (1984). Both confirm that Western culture is the source of the myths
Cornell has in mind.
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This would be a form of cultural imperialism. Despite the broad, perhaps
inexhaustible range of interpretations possible, a given myth cannot adequately
express all experience; nor can a given collection of myths. Unless we believe
that the myths of all cultures are parallel and essentially"8 equivalent, then
there will be experiences expressible in the mythology of non-Western cultures
that are not expressible in Western mythological terms.8 9 Moreover, women
who find other traditions more congenial will be encouraged to express their
experience in terms of Western myths if they wish to participate in this mythic
reinterpretation of the feminine. If, on the other hand, Cornell extends the
category of myth to cover myths from all cultures, no matter how foreign to
the audience, then the distinction between reinterpreting myth and simply
writing fiction of any kind becomes blurred. In order to avoid this hint of
cultural imperialism, Cornell needs to explain how the special value of myth
might apply in the context of a myth from a culture largely unknown to the
audience.
Assuming that Cornell's approach can avoid essentialism by generating a
wide and diverse range of reinterpretations, the question remains, from where
are these new interpretations coming? How do we generate a reinterpretation
that truly disrupts the established order rather than suffering from dereliction?
Or to put the question in MacKinnon's terms: "How is it possible to have an
engaged truth that does not simply reiterate its determinations?"90 Cornell
suggests a couple of answers to this set of questions, but I believe there is
some important work left to do here.
First, Cornell insists that although we are cast in the gender roles of our
society, we do have the ability to play those roles differently.91 Just as
language is always open to new interpretation, never completely captured by
its usage up to a given moment, so also the past and present-of either a given
individual or a whole culture-never completely determine the future. 92 Even
if the lines and acts of our character are set for us in advance, "[s]tyle is . .
affirmative." 9" The very process of performance opens the door to
disruption.94 Cornell recognizes that this argument may appear to be facile
and individualistic. The creativity involved, when described as a matter of
"style," looks arbitrary, easy, and highly individualized. It seems to ignore
88. I use the word advisedly.
89. Perhaps the origin myths of some Native American cultures provide an example. They involve
a connection to a sacred landscape that is largely missing from the Western tradition. See David C.
Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religious Liberty, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 794-95
(1991).
90. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635, 638 (1983).
91. P. 106.
92. P. 104.
93. P. 106.
94. Indeed, Cornell argues that it is precisely this acceptance of our context, while recognizing its
limits, that constitutes the "dual gesture" so important to Derrida's vision of deconstruction. Pp. 170-71,
(quoting JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC. 116 (1988)).
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the reality of suffering and the need for women to work together to end gender
subordination.95 Nonetheless, Cornell believes that this insight is central
because it shows us how we can generate challenge and disruption despite the
fact that we are already caught within conceptual systems. Our choices are not
limited to accepting or rejecting the categories of a system; we can also
transform them.96
This argument explains how a new interpretation is possible, how it can
slip in between the cracks of our determining culture, but it does not explain
the source or content of such a new interpretation. In other words, when I
prepare to act my role, and I wish to infuse it with a style that brings in
something new and challenging, where do I find the content of that challenge?
The most obvious sources are other aspects of my own culture or other human
cultures. The difficulty with these sources is that they do not help much with
the feminist project. Much of the content of existing cultures would lead to
interpretations that would confirm, rather than disrupt, gender hierarchy.
Another possible source appears in Cornell's oblique suggestion that
women's position as excluded from the symbolic order gives them access to
a different perspective from which new interpretations can be generated. In
the context of her argument against tradition-centered inquiry (a la Alisdair
Maclntyre), Cornell contends that it is precisely because women are in the
socially pathological position of being in rupture and discontinuity with our
society that we can affirm the feminine differently.97 This argument suggests
that people who find themselves largely excluded from the symbolic order may
have an advantage in generating alternative interpretations of the artifacts of
that order. They must see things differently because they find themselves
devalued and denied in the mainstream interpretation.
This argument resembles "standpoint epistemology," a common theme in
feminist theory,98 but Cornell's position is more limited and therefore
somewhat stronger. Like advocates of standpoint epistemology, Cornell argues
that those excluded from the dominant culture can and do develop alternative
perspectives critical of that culture. Unlike the standpoint epistemologists,
Cornell does not argue that such alternative perspectives have any prima facie
epistemic advantage over the dominant culture. Nonetheless, some of the
arguments against standpoint epistemologies apply to Cornell's more limited
claim as well. In order to fulfill the feminist deconstructive purpose, these
alternative perspectives must not only be different, but must disrupt the gender
95. P. 106.
96. Id.
97. P. 111.
98. Standpoint epistemologists argue that people who are members of disfavored subcultures have an
epistemic advantage because they must understand both their own culture and the majority culture in order
to survive. Since they stand, as it were, with one foot in each world, they have the critical distance
necessary to evaluate both. See SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? 124, 131-32
(1991); Hartsock, supra note 61, at 159-60; U. Narayan, The Project of Feminist Epistemology:
Perspectives from a NonWestern Feminist, in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE 265. 265-66 (1989).
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hierarchy. Yet, the source of these perspectives is the experiences of particular
people within a particular conceptual system. If we take seriously Cornell's
claim that the conceptual system generates the reality, including experience,
then it is difficult to see where these people will find the new conceptual
categories necessary to understand their own experiences in a different way."
In other words, a new experience seems to be as much the product of a new
perspective as the source of it. Thus, to rely on experience as the source of
creative disruption is simply to push the question back a step and ask how
experience can escape cultural determinism.
There is, moreover, a deeper objection that applies both to experience and
to cultures, internal and external, as a source for creative disruption. It is
important to note that Cornell's argument about creative reinterpretation goes
a step further than the earlier argument that all contexts have boundaries that
allow them to be disrupted from without. It is true that no one conceptual
system is universal (they all have boundaries), but what exists beyond those
boundaries is just other conceptual systems. Thus, whatever influences the
individual, either from inside or outside her own dominant culture, is still part
of some existing conceptual system. The argument for creative disruption
seems to require, however, that the content of new interpretations not be
determined by any existing conceptual system. Indeed, this claim is central if
the normative power of the new interpretation is not to be derived from the
"is," an existing conceptual system.
Assuming that there is an answer to the problem of where the creative new
interpretations come from, there is the further difficulty of deciding which
interpretation will guide decision-making. In the realm of literature, it is
possible to adduce endless reinterpretations without choosing among them, but
in the realm of law and policy, decisions must be made which affect peoples
lives. If this process of affirming the feminine is to have any impact on law,
then some reinterpretations must be used to guide policy decisions. A practical
use of the reinterpretations is suggested by Cornell's approval of West's efforts
to describe women's experiences in a way that makes plain their relevance to
legal doctrine. But if we are to use the reinterpretations of the feminine, then
we must be able-at least provisionally-to choose between them. We must
be able to say that some of them are better than others, at least for a given
purpose at a given moment.
Some of these decisions can, and must, be made through a highly
contextual process, a process that takes seriously the qualifiers "for a given
purpose at a given moment." For Cornell, however, this category of decisions
must be limited. Such pragmatic, contextual decision making must accept the
basic definition of purpose and context offered by the culture within which it
takes place. It can challenge some aspects of the definition, but it must leave
enough in place to serve as the standard for such a contextual decision.
99. See Williams, supra note 9, at 86.
19931
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
Cornell, however, wants the process of reinterpretation to be able to generate
precisely the type of deep and broad challenge that highly contextual decision-
making would not allow. Thus, the instances in which a choice between
reinterpretations could be made through a contextual decision-making process
must be limited if we are to leave room for sweeping transformation.
How else can we decide between competing interpretations of the feminine?
Cornell does have a central ethical insight that can guide us in evaluating
different interpretations: respect for Otherness, inclusion without assimilation.
This is an extremely attractive ethical stance and one with which many
feminists and others would agree. It is, of course, only one possible ethical
standard among many. Various feminist theorists have suggested other
standards, including human flourishing"°° or a traditional feminine ethic of
care."°l There are several requirements facing any such standard.
First, an ethical standard must be specific enough to guide decision-making.
It need not be completely determinative, but it must rule out some options in
some cases and it must suggest the kinds of considerations one should use in
deciding among the remaining options. Unless it has the ability to limit the
field of inquiry and to guide the discussion of options, a standard is
functionless.
Second, we must be told something about the epistemological status of the
proposed standard. Is it offered as an explication of what ethics and morality
mean within a particular conceptual system? If this is the status of Cornell's
principle, then it seems to undermine the very deconstructive process it is
supposed to ground because that conceptual system can (indeed should) itself
be challenged and disrupted. If, on the other hand, the standard is intended
to be supra-cultural-independent of any particular culture and therefore
appropriate for judging any cultural context-then it seems to contradict
Cornell's commitment to an epistemology in which nothing exists outside of
a cultural context.10 2
Finally, such a standard must describe its own limits, if it has any. There
are many perspectives that we attempt to exclude from our own culture which
I believe Cornell would not wish to include. Perhaps adults who sexually
molest children are an example. Such an Other is not, I presume, someone that
Cornell intends to offer inclusion without assimilation. It is possible Cornell
would respond that the principle of inclusion and respect for Otherness only
applies to those who themselves respect Others. 3 That response would raise
100. See Alison M. Jagger, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, in
GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 98, at 145, 161.
101. See generally Joan C. Tronto, Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn About Morality
from Caring? in GENDER/BODY/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 98, at 172.
102. 1 am using "culture" to mean the combination of conceptual systems and social institutions in
which a group of human beings live.
103. This would, of course, itself be a kind of limit, although one internal to the standard itself. It
is not necessary that a standard limit itself in this way; our own constitutional commitment to free speech
extends even to those who would keep others from speaking if they could. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
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the question of in what way and to what degree adults who wish to engage in
sexual acts with children fail to respect the children's Otherness, and whether
we are willing to refuse respect and inclusion to other people who fail in the
same way in relation to adults. I am not suggesting that there are no answers
to these questions, merely that until they are considered we cannot know
whether the standard has any limits.
Specifying the nature and scope of the kind of principle Cornell has
outlined, along with the source of reinterpretative content, is an enormous and
difficult task, and I am not criticizing her for not dealing with it in this book.
I raise these issues for two other reasons. First, I believe that the book opens
the door to further work along these lines that would prove extremely
interesting and valuable, and I hope that Cornell will pursue it. Second, I
believe that some of the difficulty of these issues stems from the same source
as Cornell's fundamental disagreement with West and MacKinnon: her
commitment to a particular kind of creative utopianism.
West and MacKinnon, despite their many differences, share a view that
the content of our ethical imagination can be derived from some existing
reality. For West, that reality is a natural (presocial) sense of self, and the
process of deriving ethical commitments from it is hopeful and promising. For
MacKinnon, that reality is the ideology embedded in our social system, and
the restriction it places on our ability to imagine a new form of gender relation
is painful and oppressive."'4 For both of them, however, ethics is grounded
in and in some sense determined by reality.
Cornell, however, attempts to escape from such determinism through two
mechanisms: the creative process of generating new interpretations and the
transcendent principle of respect for Otherness. The principle of respect for
Otherness, to the extent it is supra-cultural, provides a foundation for ethics
that is not part of any existing system of concepts or institutions. It is, in a
sense, a self-generating "ought"-an "ought" that is not derived from any
"is.""05 The process of creative reinterpretation functions similarly. This
process is the mechanism through which existing conceptual systems are
disrupted. If the source of that disruption were simply the experience or
concepts gained within a conceptual system-either the one being challenged
or some other one-then the "ought" of the ethical challenge would be founded
on an "is," the existing conceptual system that generated it. That is why
Cornell insists that there is always an additional element-style or
1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (striking down ordinances designed to block Nazi marchers), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
916 (1978).
104. This is the sense in which the "different (moral) voice" of women is, in MacKinnon's view,
simply the voice you hear when someone has his "foot on your neck." Feminist Discourse, Moral Values,
and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11, 28 (1985) (edited transcript of discussion, Catharine
MacKinnon speaking).
105. As such, this principle is parallel to the transcendent principles offered by other ethical systems,
like reason for Kant. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
(L.W. Beck trans., 1969).
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performance-that is not determined by the roles and categories we are given.
This element is the creative force behind reinterpretation. And this element is
also an uncaused cause, an "ought" that is not derived from any "is. " "
The uncaused, ungrounded nature of these two mechanisms is crucial for
Cornell because it is the foundation of the utopianism of her theory. It is also,
however, the source of the extremely problematic nature of the two
mechanisms. Because they ask for a causal element outside of cultural
conceptual systems, they seem in tension with her underlying epistemological
assumptions. Cornell needs to offer a convincing account of how such an
uncaused cause could exist, particularly within the epistemology she adopts,
in order to make her approach plausible. Cornell not only posits this
problematic causation, she also wishes to privilege it over the types of
causation relied on by West and MacKinnon. She argues that only this creative
project can escape the twin pitfalls of essentialism and dereliction. One
difficulty with this argument is that, until the nature of that creativity is
clearer, it is not at all apparent how her approach escapes these pitfalls. More
fundamentally, there are at least two different paths that Cornell might take
in attempting to spell out the source of creativity and the nature of her ethical
principle. One of those paths may lead to the privileging she suggests, but the
other should not.
The first path is the one I have already attributed to Cornell: the search
for an uncaused cause, an undetermined creativity and a supra-cultural ethics.
If such things could be convincingly described, they might very well be entitled
to a privilege over more determined and culturally bounded norms. They might
also, however, require major revisions in the epistemological assumptions that
Cornell has so far accepted.
The second path is to see the differences at issue here as matters of degree
rather than distinctions of kind. For example, the difference between creativity
and determinism may simply be a difference in the degree of complexity in
the causal sequence. It is not that anything is uncaused, but that the influences
on a given human being are so many, varied, and interacting that at some point
it becomes meaningless to ascribe causality to any useful subset of those
influences. At that point, we call what happens creativity. Similarly, we might
say that while no principles, ethical or otherwise, are truly culturally
independent, some apply across a wider range of cultures than others. The
difference between principles with varying scope is not a difference of kind,
but one of degree.
This second path denies Cornell's two mechanisms their privileged position
because it sees them simply as forms of more general phenomena of causality,
106. In that sense, it is parallel to traditional notions of free will as inconsistent with causal
determinism. See ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xii (1969); FRANCIS H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL
STuDIEs 6-7 (1927); Morton White, Oughts and Cans, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM 211, 215-16 (Alan Ryan
ed., 1979).
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of which West's and MacKinnon's accounts are also forms. There is no reason
to think that any one of these forms will necessarily be superior to the others
as either an explanation of gender relations or as a means of transforming those
relations. The most plausible position is that each approach, with its attendant
form of causality and its corresponding critique of gender hierarchy, will be
appropriate to some problems or projects. 07
It is important to note that this path, while it deflates the privileging of
these mechanisms, does not eliminate the ethical significance of creativity and
broad principles like respect for Otherness. Even if creativity is understood
as complex determinism, the very complexity may have moral significance.
It is the complexity that allows the only experience of freedom that human
beings know. Moreover, a complicated and varied system of causality may be
the condition in which the greatest inclusion and adaptability is possible for
each human being. Given that no social or conceptual system can include
everything, a certain amount of confusion and contradiction may create the
space for individuality and transformation that Cornell is concerned with
preserving. In other words, even on this more modest reading, the creativity
involved in reinterpretation-and the social and conceptual conditions that
sustain it-are significant in terms of Cornell's own ethical commitments.
Similarly, the breadth of an ethical principle is itself morally significant.
A principle that applies across time and space to many human cultures may
reveal what many, most, or all human beings share. Such widely shared
behaviors, characteristics, or concepts may form a basis for understanding
across other differences and through difference itself.'O A broad principle
is, therefore, valuable within Cornell's project.
This argument is not meant to foreclose the possibility and desirability of
a different kind of experience, in which one comes to have new concerns
through contact with difference. But understanding must begin with
communication and communication must begin with some shared concepts and
concerns. Ethical principles of broad applicability are morally significant
because they point toward such shared concepts and concerns.
It is unclear to me from this book which of these two paths Cornell would
choose to follow. Her rhetoric seems to lean toward the first path, but I believe
that her epistemological commitments incline toward the second. The latter
path seems more promising to me, not least because of its greater openness
to and appreciation of the contributions of feminists using very different
approaches to the problems of gender hierarchy.
107. Which raises another interesting, and I hope fruitful, question: how do we tell when to use which
argument?
108. Something shared need not be the same for all those who share it. I mean to point here not to
similarity but to something more like congruence: a sense of being able to understand an alien practice or
concept from the inside in terms of concerns that are already meaningful to you. By "from the inside" I
mean as someone within the culture containing it might understand its function and meaning, rather than
as an outsider.
1993]
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III. CONCLUSION
Beyond Accommodation is a fascinating and powerful account of a very
original feminist theory. It should, and I hope will, spark further discussion
of issues central to the present stage of feminist theorizing. I have suggested
some of the choices that may lie ahead in such a discussion, and why I believe
that a particular direction may be a fruitful one for exploration. Cornell's book
argues with grace and passion that, while we continue this exploration, we
must not lose sight of a crucial moral imperative: the refusal to accommodate
a system of gender hierarchy that repudiates the feminine.
